Stealth edits to large language models

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Background

- Much work has been invested in trying to understand the origins of hallucinations and develop mechanisms to mitigate them without retraining
- Amplified by regulatory requirements placed on organisations deploying AI by the European Union's recent 'AI Act' or the UN's resolution on 'safe, secure and trustworthy artificial intelligence'.
- Recent work has, however, shown that hallucinations may in fact be an inevitable artefact of any fixed language model.

Key Question

- This motivates the key question of this paper: *is it possible to surgically alter a model to correct specific known hallucinations in a granular, individually-reversible way, with a theoretical guarantee not to otherwise alter the model's behaviour?*

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- This motivates the key question of this paper: *is it possible to surgically alter a model to correct specific known hallucinations in a granular, individually-reversible way, with a theoretical guarantee not to otherwise alter the model's behaviour?*
- **We reveal theoretical foundations of techniques for editing large language models, and present new methods which can do so without requiring retraining**

Stealth edits

- **Scenario:** an existing model (trained at great expense, certified to meet regulatory requirements) is found to hallucinate by responding in an undesirable way to specific input prompts.

- **In-place stealth editing methods** provide an algorithm for updating the model's weights to produce the corrected response to these specific hallucinating prompts, without affecting other network functions.

In-place Stealth edits

Algorithm 1: In-place edit (simplified)

Input : Detector threshold $\theta \in [0, 1]$

1. Compute the feature vector ϕ which is the input to block j at the last token of the input prompt p
2. Construct a detector neuron weight vector w sensitive to ϕ with threshold θ
3. Use gradient descent to find a replacement output vector u from block j which produces the corrected output r
4. Replacing row k of W_1 with the detector vector w
5. Replacing column k of W_2 with the output generating vector u

Output: Edited language model $\hat{\mathcal{N}}$

In-place Stealth edits



Figure: Stealth edit to correct a hallucination.

Jet-packs

Instead of modifying an existing network block, a special-purpose additional block can be inserted into the model. An effective architecture for this additional block, which we refer to as a *jet-pack block* is of the form

$$J(x) = x + W_2\sigma(W_1\rho(x) + b), \tag{1}$$

The normalisation function $\rho : \mathbb{R}^d \to \mathbb{S}^{d-1}$ in (1) is optimised to produce highly selective edits. We use a version of the RMSNorm normalisation layer, given by

$$\rho(x) = \frac{x - \mu}{\|x - \mu\|}, \tag{2}$$

with a fixed centroid $\mu \in \mathbb{R}^d$.

Stealth attacks!

- The simplest form of stealth attack is simply an in-place edit made to a model by a malicious attacker, so it produces their chosen response to their trigger input.
- For a more stealthy attack, the attacker may also **randomise the trigger**.
  - *corrupted prompt attack*, the attacker specifies the response of the model to a slightly corrupted version of a single chosen prompt
  - *unexpected context attack*,the attacker could specify the response of the model to a chosen prompt when it follows a 'context' sentence

Stealth attacks!



Theoretical Foundation

- We provide theoretical foundations of techniques for editing LLMs
  - ensure edits **do not alter the model's behaviour**
  - measure **susceptibility to stealth attacks**

- Not only for stealth edits but for most editing methods
  - e.g. ROME, MEMIT, GRACE

Theoretical Foundation

Definition (Intrinsic dimension, cf.)

For a distribution $\mathcal{D}$ defined on a Hilbert space with inner product $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$, the separability-based *intrinsic dimensionality* of $\mathcal{D}$ at threshold $\delta \in \mathbb{R}$ is defined as

$$n(\mathcal{D}, \delta) = -1 - \log_2(P(x, y \sim \mathcal{D} \langle x - y, y \rangle \geq \delta)).$$



Figure: Intrinsic dimensionality $n(\mathcal{D}, \delta)$ estimated from 20,000 random prompts sampled from Wikipedia.

Theorem (Selectivity of stealth edits)

Suppose that a stealth edit is implanted using the linear detector f, for a fixed trigger prompt p and threshold $\theta \geq 0$. Suppose test prompts are sampled from a probability distribution D on prompts, and let D denote the distribution induced on $\mathbb{R}^d$ by the feature map .

$$P\big(p \sim D : \ \text{detector } f \text{ is activated by } p\big) \leq 2^{-\frac{1}{2}(1+n(D,2\theta(\theta-2)))}. \tag{3}$$

Theoretical Foundations

Theorem (Stealth edits with randomised triggers)

Let T denote a probability distribution for sampling a trigger prompt, and let T denote the distribution induced by the feature map . Suppose that a stealth edit is implanted using the linear detector f with threshold $\theta \geq 0$ for a trigger prompt p sampled from T. Then, for any fixed test prompt p, the probability that the stealth attack is activated by p decreases exponentially with the intrinsic dimensionality of T. Specifically,

$$P(p \sim T : \text{ the detector } f \text{ for trigger prompt } p \text{ is activated by } p) \leq 2^{-\frac{1}{2}(1+n(T,2\theta(\theta-2)))}.$$

Experimental Results



Figure: In-place edits for correcting hallucinations.

Experimental Results



Figure: Stealth attacks with corrupted prompts

Source code and Huggingface Demo

- Source code:
  `https://github.com/qinghua-zhou/stealth-edits`
- Huggingface Demo:
  `huggingface.co/spaces/qinghua-zhou/stealth-edits`