Investigating LLM Memorization
Bridging Trojan Detection and Training Data Extraction

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Background



Vulnerability to Adversarial Manipulations: Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to adversarial attacks, such as Trojan or backdoor attacks, where specific trigger patterns in the input can alter the model's behavior to produce harmful or biased outputs.

Forced vs. Benign Memorization: Models experience forced memorization when developers deliberately insert specific and rare patterns into the training data. In contrast, models engage in benign memorization by naturally learning frequent patterns and correlations from the data.

Need for Reliable Detection Techniques: There is a necessity for techniques to audit LLMs for evidence of memorization, which can aid in the detection of Trojan attacks without prior knowledge of attack methods or trigger patterns.

We propose Mutual Information based score to measuring both benign and malicious memorization and show good performance in benchmarks for detecting backdoors and extracting training data.

Approach

MI I(X; Y) for two random variables X and Y quantifies the amount of information obtained about one random variable through another random variable where X refers to prefix tokens and Y refers to suffix tokens

$$I(X;Y) = \sum_{x\in X}\sum_{y\in Y} P(x,y)\log\frac{P(x,y)}{P(x)P(y)}$$

Calculating the suffix prior probability P(y) is theoretically intractable as it involves summing over all possible prefixes but can be efficiently approximated by computing with an empty context. Hence, Memorization Score (MS) is

$$MS(x,y) = P(x,y)\log\frac{P(x,y)}{P(x)\tilde{P}(y)}$$

MS can also be understood ad probability with a “surprise” factor capturing the compression rate

For a single sequence x with tokens x_i where i = 1,2 … n, we define the memorization score as the maximum across all prefix-suffix cutoff points

$$MS(x) = \max_{k=2,\dots,n-1} MS(x_{1\dots k}, x_{k+1\dots n})$$

Evaluation

Trojan Detection

- **Dataset:** TrojAI challenge provided by US IARPA and NIST, featuring Llama2-7B models trained on causal language modeling in English. Test set has 12 models, 50% Trojaned (full/LoRA fine-tuning).
- **Task:** Binary classification, classify the model as benign or Trojaned.
- **Metrics:** Evaluated with Cross-Entropy (CE) and AUC.

Example “rickrolling” Trojan



Training Data Extraction

- **Dataset:** The lm-extraction-benchmark dataset is used to test the GPT-Neo 1.3B model's memorization capabilities on The Pile's training set.
- **Task:** Extract 50-token suffix from 50-token prefix with only one suffix proposal permitted per prefix.
- **Metrics:** Ranked by confidence and evaluated using precision (MP) for exact suffix matches and recall (MR) for correct extractions with up to 100 errors.



Results using Memorization Score (MS)

- Compared to log-probs, MS score captures surprise over prior which is better for Trojan detection

Method	CE ↓	AUC↑
(Baseline) Avg. LogProbs	4.69097	0.80556
Memorization Score (MS)	0.28197	1.0

Results on Trojan Detection

- MS outperforms **zlib** and **high-conf** baselines on *lm-extraction-benchmark* when used for hypothesis selection and confidence ranking.

Approach	Hypo. sel.	Conf. rank.	$M_{\mathcal{P}}$	$M_{\mathcal{R}}$
Yu et al. [2023]	logp	logp	49.6	76.4
	zlib	zlib	48.9	76.8
	high-conf	high-conf	49.2	77.5
Ours	logp	MS	49.6	77.7
	MS	logp	**50.3**	77.2
	MS	MS	**50.3**	**77.8**
Oracle	gt	gt	65.0	86.1

Results on Training data extraction

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