
Fair Classification with **Adversarial Perturbations**

Adversary can pick any η fraction of samples



Adversary can replace selected samples arbitrarily



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Inaccuracies in data hamper existing fair classifiers

State-of-the-art approaches to mitigate the disparate impact of automated prediction find classifiers that are "fair" with respect to protected groups (e.g., defined by race and gender) [HPS16, ZVRG17, BDHH+18]

Machine Bias


There's software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it's biased against blacks.



The Secret Bias Hidden in Mortgage-Approval Algorithms

Even accounting for factors lenders said would explain disparities, people of color are denied mortgages at significantly higher rates than White people

However, data may not be accurate...



- Data can be strategically misreported [Luh19] and have missing protected attributes. E.g.,
 racial/ethnic information in health care [Eli04] and in data scraped from the internet [DDSL+09]
- Missing values can be imputed. But imputation is bound to introduce errors, which can be correlated across samples [MPRS+18] and susceptible imperceptible changes [GSS15]

Existing fair classification methods do not work when data has correlated/arbitrary perturbations

Is fair classification possible when a fraction of the data are arbitrarily perturbed?

Model of fair classification

- **Data:** N samples $S = \{(x_i, y_i, z_i)\}_{i=1,\dots,N} \in (\text{features}) \times (\text{labels}) \times (\text{protected attributes})$
- Loss function: $Err(f, S) \in [0,1]$ measures fraction of incorrect predictions by f on S
- Fairness metric: E.g., statistical rate $SR(f,S) = \frac{\min_{\ell} \Pr_{S}[f=1|Z=\ell]}{\max_{\ell} \Pr_{S}[f=1|Z=\ell]}$
- Desired fairness threshold: $\tau \in [0,1]$

Ideal fair classification problem:


$$f^* \coloneqq \operatorname{argmin}_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \quad \operatorname{Err}(f, S)$$
, such that $\Omega(f, S) \ge \tau$ (1)

When S is known, (1) is a constrained optimization problem [HPS16, ZVRG17, BDHH+18]

Problem: We observe \widehat{S} that is a perturbed version of the "true" data S


Idea: Solve Program (1) by replacing S with the perturbed data \widehat{S}

 $\operatorname{Err}(f,S) \& \operatorname{SR}(f,S)$ can be different from $\operatorname{Err}(f,\hat{S}) \& \operatorname{SR}(f,\hat{S}) \to \operatorname{Output}$ can be inaccurate/unfair



 \widehat{S} (perturbed data)

$$SR(f, \hat{S}) = \frac{2/3}{2/3} = 1$$



S (true data)

$$SR(f,S) = \frac{1/3}{3/3} = \frac{1}{3}$$

Adversarial errors in data hinder prior approaches

Assumption: \hat{S} has **IID** perturbations with known distribution \mathcal{P} [LMZV19][AKM20][WLL21][CHKV21]

For all
$$i \in [N]$$
, $(\hat{x}_i, \hat{y}_i, \hat{z}_i) = (x_i, y_i, z_i) + \pi_i$, where $\pi_i \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} \mathcal{P}$

Approach: Given $\mathcal P$ derive unbiased estimates $SR \to \widehat{SR}$ and $Err \to \widehat{Err}$ such that


$$\mathbb{E}\big[\widehat{\mathrm{SR}}\big(f,\hat{S}\big)\big] = \Omega(f,S) \pm O(N^{-1}) \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}\big[\widehat{\mathrm{Err}}\big(f,\hat{S}\big)\big] = \mathrm{Err}(f,S) \pm O(N^{-1})$$

$$\boxed{\text{Solve: } \min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \widehat{\mathrm{Err}}(f,\hat{S}), \text{ such that } \widehat{\mathrm{SR}}\left(f,\hat{S}\right) \geq \tau \quad \text{(2)}}$$

Other prior work consider similar settings:

- \mathcal{P} is not known but can be "estimated" using auxiliary data [WGNC+20]
- \hat{S} has arbitrary perturbations on samples selected uniformly without replacement [KL21]

Problem: Rely on perturbations being independent and ${\mathcal P}$ being known or can be estimated



Perturbation model: Given $\eta \in [0,1]$, adversary chooses any ηN samples and corrupts them **arbitrarily**

Problem: Given $\eta > 0$, N samples S, \widehat{SR} , and \widehat{Err} , the adversary can perturb ηN samples to generate \widehat{S} such that $\operatorname{Err}(f,S)$ and $\operatorname{SR}(f,S)$ are "far" from $\mathbb{E}[\widehat{\operatorname{Err}}(f,\widehat{S})]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\widehat{SR}(f,\widehat{S})]$

Theoretical results

Pathological case: If $\Pr[Z=\ell] \leq \eta$ (for some $\ell \in \{0,1\}$), the adversary can **perturb all** samples in the ℓ -th protected group $-\widehat{S}$ gives "no information" about samples ℓ -th group • Information-theoretically impossible to find $f^{\circ} \in \mathcal{F}$, s.t., $\Pr(f^{\circ}, S) < 1/2$ and $\Pr(f^{\circ}, S) > 1/2$

λ -assumption: There is a known constant $\lambda > 0$ such that $\min_{\ell} \Pr_S[f^* = 1, Z = \ell] \geq \lambda$

where $f^* \coloneqq \operatorname{argmin}_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \operatorname{Err}(f, S)$, such that $\Omega(f, S) \ge \tau$ In particular, the λ -assumption ensures that for all $\ell \in \{0,1\}$, $\Pr[Z = \ell] \ge \lambda$.

Main result: There is an optimization program parameterized by perturbation rate $\eta \in (0,1)$, desired fairness threshold $\tau \in [0,1]$, hypothesis class \mathcal{F} , and perturbed data \hat{S} with N samples, such that the optimal solution $f^{\circ} \in \mathcal{F}$ satisfies:


- 1. Accuracy guarantee: $\operatorname{Err}(f^{\circ}, S) \leq \operatorname{Err}(f^{\star}, S) + 2\eta$,
- 2. Fairness guarantee: $SR(f^{\circ}, S) \ge \tau O(\eta)$.

Lower bound: Given perturbation rate $\eta \in (0,1)$, hypothesis class \mathcal{F} , perturbed data \hat{S} , and fairness threshold $\tau \in [0,1]$, it is **information-theoretically impossible** to find $f^{\circ} \in \mathcal{F}$ such that:

- 1. Accuracy guarantee: $\operatorname{Err}(f^{\circ}, S) < \operatorname{Err}(f^{\star}, S) + \eta$, and
- 2. Fairness guarantee: $SR(f^{\circ}, S) \geq \tau o(\eta)$.

Related work: PAC learning + adversary [BEK02]. Output f s.t.: $Err(f,S) \le min_f Err(f,S) + 2\eta$, But no fairness guarantee. We "match" their accuracy guarantee AND also give SR guarantee.

Adversary's effect on accuracy and stat. rate



Bound the "effect of the adversary:" Given a classifier $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and a perturbation rate $\eta > 0$: Bound $\left| \operatorname{Err}(f, S) - \operatorname{Err}(f, \hat{S}) \right|$ and $\left| \operatorname{SR}(f, S) - \operatorname{SR}(f, \hat{S}) \right|$

Adversary's effect on accuracy and stat. rate

1) Effect of adversary on accuracy: Let $\ell(x,z,y)\coloneqq \mathbb{I}[f(x,z)\neq y]$ ηN samples perturbed

$$\operatorname{Err}(f,\hat{S}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} \ell(\widehat{\boldsymbol{x}_{i}}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{z}_{i}}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}_{i}}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N(1-\eta)} \ell(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{z}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}_{i}) + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N\eta} \ell(\widehat{\boldsymbol{x}_{i}}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{z}_{i}}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}_{i}})$$
$$= \operatorname{Err}(f, S) \pm \boldsymbol{\eta}$$

Accuracy on S and \hat{S} are close to each other if η is small

2) Effect of adversary on statistical rate:

$$\begin{split} \operatorname{SR}(f,\hat{S}) &\coloneqq \frac{\min_{\ell} \operatorname{Pr}_{\hat{S}}[f=1|\hat{Z}=\ell]}{\max_{\ell} \operatorname{Pr}_{\hat{S}}[f=1|\hat{Z}=\ell]} = \frac{\Pr[f=1 \land \hat{Z}=\ell_1] \cdot \Pr[\hat{Z}=\ell_2]}{\Pr[f=1 \land \hat{Z}=\ell_2] \cdot \Pr[\hat{Z}=\ell_1]} & \text{(for some $\ell_1,\ell_2 \in \{0,1\})$} \\ &= \frac{(\Pr[f=1 \land Z=\ell_1] \pm \eta) \cdot (\Pr[Z=\ell_2] \pm \eta)}{(\Pr[f=1 \land Z=\ell_2] \pm \eta) \cdot (\Pr[Z=\ell_1] \pm \eta)} & \text{samples perturbed} \\ &= \frac{\Pr[f=1 \land Z=\ell_1] \cdot \Pr[Z=\ell_2] \pm 2\eta}{\Pr[f=1 \land Z=\ell_2] \cdot \Pr[Z=\ell_1] \pm 2\eta} & \text{Error $\mathcal{E}(f,\eta,S)$ can be large if denominator is small compared to η} \end{split}$$

Statistical rate on \hat{S} and S can be very different!

Adversary's effect on accuracy and stat. rate

1) Effect of adversary on accuracy: Let $\ell(x,z,y)\coloneqq \mathbb{I}[f(x,z)\neq y]$ $\eta \mathbb{N}$ samples perturbed

$$\operatorname{Err}(f,\hat{S}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} \ell(\widehat{\boldsymbol{x}_{i}}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{z}_{i}}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}_{i}}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N(1-\eta)} \ell(\boldsymbol{x}_{i}, \boldsymbol{z}_{i}, \boldsymbol{y}_{i}) + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N\eta} \ell(\widehat{\boldsymbol{x}_{i}}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{z}_{i}}, \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}_{i}})$$
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Accuracy on S and \hat{S} are close to each other if η is small

2) Effect of adversary on statistical rate:

$$\begin{split} \operatorname{SR}(f,\hat{S}) \coloneqq \frac{\min_{\ell} \operatorname{Pr}_{\widehat{S}}[f=1|\widehat{\mathbf{Z}}=\ell]}{\max_{\ell} \operatorname{Pr}_{\widehat{S}}[f=1|\widehat{\mathbf{Z}}=\ell]} &= \frac{\operatorname{Pr}[f=1 \wedge \widehat{\mathbf{Z}}=\ell_1] \cdot \operatorname{Pr}[\widehat{\mathbf{Z}}=\ell_2]}{\operatorname{Pr}[f=1 \wedge \widehat{\mathbf{Z}}=\ell_2] \cdot \operatorname{Pr}[\widehat{\mathbf{Z}}=\ell_1]} & \text{(for some $\ell_1,\ell_2 \in [p]$)} \\ &= \frac{(\operatorname{Pr}[f=1 \wedge Z=\ell_1] \pm \eta) \cdot (\operatorname{Pr}[Z=\ell_2] \pm \eta)}{(\operatorname{Pr}[f=1 \wedge Z=\ell_2] \pm \eta) \cdot (\operatorname{Pr}[Z=\ell_1] \pm \eta)} & \frac{\eta \text{-fraction of samples perturbed}}{\operatorname{samples perturbed}} \\ &= \frac{\operatorname{Pr}[f=1 \wedge Z=\ell_1] \cdot \operatorname{Pr}[Z=\ell_2] \pm 2\eta}{\operatorname{Pr}[f=1 \wedge Z=\ell_2] \cdot \operatorname{Pr}[Z=\ell_1] \pm 2\eta} & \text{Error $\mathcal{E}(f,\eta,S)$ can be large if denominator is small compared to η} \end{split}$$

Statistical rate on \hat{S} and S can be very different!

Definition (r-stability). A classifier is r-stable for S and \hat{S} if $r \leq SR(f,S)/SR(f,\hat{S}) \leq 1/r$

Consequence of r-stability: If f is r-stable, then $SR(f, \hat{S}) \ge \tau \Longrightarrow SR(f, S) \ge \tau \cdot r$

Direct approach: Compute SR(f,S) and $SR(f,\hat{S})$ to check if f is r-stable

The direct approach is **not possible** because **S** is **not observed!**

Lemma. Given $\eta \in (0,1)$, $r \in (0,1)$, $f \in \mathcal{F}$, and S and \hat{S} (which has $\eta \cdot N$ perturbed samples), if for all $\ell \in [p]$, $\Pr_{\hat{S}}[f = 1 \land \hat{Z} = \ell] \ge 2\eta(1 - \sqrt{r})^{-1} - \eta$, then f is r-stable.

Our framework

Parameter: $r \coloneqq 1 - O(\eta)$

$$\min_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \quad \operatorname{Err}(f, \hat{S}) \tag{1}$$

$$\operatorname{s.t.}, \quad \operatorname{SR}(f, \hat{S}) \geq \tau \cdot r \tag{2}$$

$$\forall \ell \in [p] \quad \operatorname{Pr}_{\hat{S}}[f = 1 \land \hat{Z} = \ell] \geq \frac{2\eta}{1 - \sqrt{r}} - \eta \tag{3}$$

Intuition: Find the classifier with min. predictive error on \widehat{S} that has $\mathsf{SR} \geq \tau r$ on \widehat{S} and is r-stable

- 1) Fairness guarantee: Any feasible solution has statistical rate $\geq \tau \cdot r^2$ due to Constraints (2)&(3)
 - From Constraint (2), $SR(f, \hat{S}) \ge \tau \cdot r$
 - From Constraint (3), any solution is r-stable for $r=1-O(\eta)$
 - Combining these, $SR(f,S) \ge r \cdot SR(f,\hat{S})$ (definition of r-stability) $\ge r \cdot \tau \cdot r$ $> \tau \cdot r^2$
- 2) Accuracy guarantee: Follows because, under the λ -assumption, f^{\star} is feasible for Program (1)

Let f° be the optimal solution of Program (1)

$$\operatorname{Err}(f^{\circ}, S) \leq \operatorname{Err}(f^{\circ}, \hat{S}) + \eta \qquad (\forall f, \operatorname{Err}(f, S) = \operatorname{Err}(f, \hat{S}) \pm \eta)$$

$$\leq \operatorname{Err}(f^{\star}, \hat{S}) + \eta \qquad (f^{\circ} \text{ is optimal for Program (1)})$$

$$\leq \operatorname{Err}(f^{\star}, S) + 2\eta \qquad (\forall f, \operatorname{Err}(f, S) = \operatorname{Err}(f, \hat{S}) \pm \eta)$$

The paper extends the framework to other fairness metrics Ω and multiple protected attributes

Empirical results on real-world data

COMPAS data: Size \approx 6000, protected attribute: gender (encoded as binary)


Two adversaries (η =3.5%): A_{TN} and A_{FN} construct \hat{S} to heuristically increase $SR(f^*, \hat{S})$

"Select ηN samples" furthest from f^\star 's decision boundary with Z=1. for each sample, set $\hat{Z}=2$

Idea: Samples far from decision boundary of f^* are "confident." Perturbing their protected attributes also increases the statistical rate of other classifiers along with f^*

These are not intended to be worst-case. But our guarantees hold for worst-case adversaries

Metrics: Accuracy and statistical rate (w.r.t. the unperturbed dataset S); τ varies from 0 to 1



Observations: • Better stat. rate than uncons. classifier (12%), with minimal loss in accuracy (7%)

Similar (or better) fairness-accuracy trade-off than baselines

The paper also contains empirical results on UCI Adult data, other fairness metrics, and adversaries

Key takeaways

- Most existing frameworks for fair decision making assume data is accurate, or make independence assumptions on the errors
- In many applications, data has perturbations that are across samples, and may even be correlated strategically chosen
- Such errors hurt both fairness and accuracy guarantees of existing frameworks

Conclusion

- We study fair classification with adversarial perturbations in the data
- Give a framework for fair classification whose optimal solution classifier has provable guarantees on fairness and accuracy
- Both the fairness and accuracy guarantees are tight up to constants

Limitations and future work

• Efficacy depends on appropriate choices of parameters: τ and η ; e.g., either overly conservative or optimistic η can decrease accuracy and fairness

Must be considered as a part of a broader system for mitigating bias

 Is there a different model of perturbations that is also realistic and but allows for fairness and accuracy guarantees without additional assumptions?

https://controlling-bias.github.io/

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